The firearms-offense deportability ground at INA §237(a)(2)(C) (8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(C)) is unusual in two ways: it reaches any conviction — felony or misdemeanor — and it requires no minimum sentence. A single misdemeanor unlawful-firearm-possession conviction makes a noncitizen lawful permanent resident deportable from the United States, with no general waiver. The BIA’s most-recent categorical-approach guidance on the ground is Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 27 I&N Dec. 21 (BIA 2017), decided August 11, 2017 — the decision that anchors current adjudication on the divisibility analysis for state firearm statutes.
What changed
The statutory text covers convictions for “purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, in violation of any law, any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in 18 U.S.C. §921(a)).” The deportability ground:
- Imports the federal definition of “firearm” from 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(3), which excludes antique firearms as defined in §921(a)(16).
- Imports the federal definition of “destructive device” from §921(a)(4).
- Requires no minimum sentence — unlike most other deportability grounds.
- Reaches no specific intent — bare possession is sufficient if the state statute reaches it.
The categorical approach controls. The BIA in Matter of Chairez-Castrejon analyzed whether a Utah felony-discharge-of-a-firearm statute was categorically a firearms offense for §237(a)(2)(C) purposes. The Board’s answer turned on whether the state statute swept more broadly than the federal definition — specifically, whether the state statute reached antique firearms that the federal definition excludes.
Three doctrinal points from Chairez-Castrejon:
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The antique-firearm carve-out matters. The federal definition of “firearm” at §921(a)(3) excludes “any antique firearm,” which §921(a)(16) defines as a firearm manufactured in or before 1898 (with several detailed subcategories for replica and matchlock-style firearms). A state firearm-possession statute that does not exclude antique firearms reaches conduct the federal definition does not — making it overbroad for §237(a)(2)(C) purposes unless divisible.
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The realistic-probability check applies. Under Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), a court applying the categorical approach must determine whether there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition.” Pointing to a state’s plain statutory text reaching antique firearms is itself sufficient evidence of the realistic probability under Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) — no separate case-law example is needed.
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Divisibility under Mathis controls the modified-categorical analysis. A state statute that lists alternative means (rather than alternative elements) is not divisible — and the Shepard-document inquiry cannot save an overbroad statute. State pattern jury instructions are the controlling source on divisibility.
The earlier Matter of Mendez-Orellana, 25 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2010) had introduced the antique-firearm analysis but stopped short of the divisibility framework that Chairez-Castrejon supplied. The two decisions, read together, are the current standard.
Why it matters
The firearms ground has no general waiver:
- No §212(h) waiver applies — §212(h) waives certain inadmissibility grounds but not the parallel deportability ground at §237(a)(2)(C).
- No discretionary INA waiver matches the firearms ground specifically.
- Cancellation of removal under §240A(a) is available if the noncitizen meets the 7-year continuous-residence and 5-year LPR thresholds and the conviction is not an aggravated felony — but a firearms-trafficking conviction is an aggravated felony under §101(a)(43)(C), and a §922(g) felon-in-possession conviction with a one-year sentence may qualify under §101(a)(43)(E)(ii).
The categorical defense is therefore the practitioner’s main tool. State firearm statutes vary dramatically:
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Some states explicitly exclude antique firearms — for example, statutes that adopt the federal definition by reference. These statutes are not overbroad and convictions under them are categorically §237(a)(2)(C) offenses.
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Some states reach all firearms regardless of age — covering antique firearms in their definition. Convictions under such overbroad statutes are not categorically §237(a)(2)(C) offenses; if the statute is also not divisible, deportability fails entirely.
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Some states are divisible — listing alternative firearm definitions only some of which match the federal definition. The modified categorical approach applies, and the record-of-conviction documents determine the outcome.
The federal felon-in-possession statute at 18 U.S.C. §922(g) is itself categorically a §237(a)(2)(C) offense — but it carries additional aggravated-felony exposure under §101(a)(43)(E)(ii) for sentences of one year or more, which strips cancellation eligibility.
Way forward
A practical workflow for §237(a)(2)(C) cases:
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Pull the statute of conviction and its definition section. Identify how the state defines “firearm.” If the definition does not exclude antique firearms (manufactured before 1898), test for overbreadth under Chairez-Castrejon.
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Test divisibility under Mathis. Pull state pattern jury instructions, controlling state-court precedent, and the indictment language. If the alternatives are means rather than elements, the statute is indivisible — and an overbroad indivisible statute defeats deportability.
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For divisible statutes, pull the Shepard documents. The charging document, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and judgment narrow the conviction to a specific alternative. If the documents do not specify which alternative the defendant pleaded to, the conviction defaults to the broadest alternative.
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Cross-check the aggravated-felony exposure. A §922(g) conviction with a one-year sentence is an aggravated felony under §101(a)(43)(E)(ii); a firearms-trafficking conviction is an aggravated felony under §101(a)(43)(C). The sentence and the elements both matter at plea negotiation.
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For LPR clients with §237(a)(2)(C) exposure who meet the continuous-residence and LPR thresholds, file §240A(a) cancellation. The hardship analysis is the Matter of Marin / Matter of C-V-T- framework — favorable family ties, length of residence, hardship to family members, evidence of rehabilitation.
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Cross-check the USCIS Policy Manual on naturalization if your client is in the N-400 window — firearms convictions are not a per se GMC bar but may be considered as adverse discretionary factors in the N-400 review.
Disclaimer
Fola Form is a software company, not a law firm. Nothing in this article is legal advice and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Firearms-offense deportability analysis is statute-specific and circuit-specific; the categorical analysis turns on the exact text of the state statute, the divisibility doctrine in the controlling circuit, and the federal definition of “firearm” at the time of conviction. Verify against the primary source — the Board of Immigration Appeals precedent decisions index (for Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 27 I&N Dec. 21) — along with the INA §237(a)(2)(C) statutory text and 18 U.S.C. §921(a) before relying on this analysis in any individual case. Consult a licensed immigration attorney about firearms-offense exposure on a specific record of conviction.